Europe-US Cooperation Pays Off in Tehran

October 29, 2003
By Geoffrey Kemp

On October 21, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany visited Tehran to talk to the Iranian government about its nuclear program.  Working very closely with Secretary Powell and the State Department all along the way, the three ministers largely avoided the temptation to make a deal simply so as to avoid walking away empty-handed.  Indeed, as representatives of the three most powerful countries in the European Union, the ministers carried a lot of weight and the Iranians were duly impressed.  At the end of the day, a joint communiqué was issued.  Iran agreed to answer all the questions about its nuclear activities put to it by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors on September 12, 2003 (John Bolton is currently in Madrid closely reviewing the material Iran has handed over); it agreed to sign the Additional Protocol of the IAEA’s Safeguards Program, which will permit more intrusive inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities; and, perhaps most surprisingly, it agreed to suspend activities at its uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and other nuclear processing activities.

The outcome was heralded in the European press as a great success for the EU’s policy of engagement with the regime.  Some observers added that it showed Europe’s “soft power” could be as effective as America’s “hard power” in resolving proliferation issues.  The response in Iran was muted.  By and large, reformers welcomed the outcome, while some hardliners denounced it.  The Bush Administration was cautious but positive in its public utterances.  At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on October 28, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage referred to the agreement as a “good declaration” and applauded the European ministers for “hanging tough” in their negotiations.

What does all this add up to?  Is Iran now pledged to end its nuclear program?  The answer is no.  The Iranian government has made it very clear that, while it does not seek a nuclear weapons program, it will pursue its nuclear energy needs, including the production of nuclear fuel.  Its spokesman made it clear that the suspension of fuel processing activities could last perhaps a day or a perhaps a year; either way, it is Iran’s choice.  They were invoking the delay simply as a confidence building measure. This is the problem.  What the EU and the US want is for Iran to stop all fuel cycle activities, even though they are legally permitted to develop such capabilities if they are in compliance with their NPT obligations. 

The Europeans are prepared to offer Iran a deal whereby Iran is guaranteed access to fuel for their nuclear power reactors, but the fuel must be provided by an outside source –probably Russia – and, after the fuel has been used, it must be returned for reprocessing or disposal.  There are two problems with this offer.  First, it is unlikely that Iran will accept it, given its fear of isolation.  Iranians remember all too well that during the Iran-Iraq war they were subjected to a very effective international arms embargo, while their adversary, Iraq, had access to unlimited foreign arms, paid for with loans from the Arab Gulf countries.  Memories of that war and how the world ignored them while Saddam Hussein gassed their soldiers remain vivid and powerful.

The second problem is that it is not yet clear that the Bush Administration will go along with the European plan.  In his Senate testimony, Armitage announced that the US would work closely with its allies to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem and that the US was prepared to resume meeting with Iranian officials to discuss the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But there are some in the Bush Administration opposed to any compromise with the Tehran regime, let alone permitting it to have access to safeguarded nuclear fuel. 

Nevertheless, what was achieved on October 21 was an important first step in defusing a potential crisis between Iran and the international community. Perhaps the most immediate benefit will be to prompt a serious debate among Iranians themselves as to the wisdom of pursuing a fully independent nuclear program.  The next political hurdle may be in 2004, when the nuclear power plant the Russians have been building for Iran at Bushehr should become operational.  Iran and Russia have yet to finalize an agreement for fuel supplies.  If they do, and the reactor begins operations, Iran will be in a position to divert the irradiated fuel for plutonium production, which could be used in a weapon.  Although this would not be easy and quite easily detected, it could be still done, and Iran’s bomb could become a reality.  Whether Tehran would take such a drastic step and risk UN sanctions will depend upon the regional security environment.  If resumed political dialogue with the US is productive, Iran will have little incentive to throw down a nuclear challenge.  But if relations with the United States worsen because of the situation in Iraq, then the hardliners in Tehran might be prepared to institute a crash program for the bomb for reasons of regime survival.

Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center.